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PREDESTINATION AND SWISS ARBITRATION LAW:
GENEVA'S APPLICATION OF THE INTERCANTONAL
CONCORDAT
PHmIipPE NEYROUDt
WILLIAM W. PARK*

PREFACE

Historically, Geneva has proved an attractive site for international commercial arbitration.Today, however, Geneva's arbitral
popularity is threatened by the interventionistpractices of Switzerland's cantonal courts, which have liberally interpretedtheir powers to review and overturn arbitralawards. In an effort to prevent a
decline in Switzerland's popularity as an arbitral center, Swiss
jurists have recently proposed rules providing for greater arbitral
autonomy in the private resolution of international business disputes. The authors analyze Swissjudicialintervention in the arbitral
process, the problems inherent in such intervention, and a proposed
solution to those problems.
I.

INTRODUCTION

"We call predestination God's eternal decree, by which he
determined with himself what he willed to become of each man."
John Calvin*
Calvin's theology lives in the arbitration law of the city once subject to his
spiritual tutelage. Divine law, according to Calvin, predestined men's eternal
condition to conform to the will of God. Swiss law, according to recent
Swiss court decisions, predestines arbitrators' decisions to conform to the
will of the local judge. The arbitrators' purported autonomy to decide the
dispute reveals itself as illusory as men's vain attempts to exercise free will.
The whimsical parallel between God's eternal decree and the mandatory
t Member of the Geneva Bar.
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Visiting Professor of Law,
Institute Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva. The authors wish
to thank Mary Kissane for her help with this article.
© Phillippe Neyroud and William Park.
* Institutes Of The Christian Religion (InstitutioReligionis Christianae) (1536),
Book III, Chapter xxii, Section 5, translated by F.L. Battles, reprintedin 21 Library
of Christian Classics (J. McNeil, ed. 1960 at 969).
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norms of Swiss law suggests itself in several recent cases restricting the
independence of the arbitral process in Switzerland. Cantonal courts annul
awards perceived incorrect, while federal courts overturn cantonal decisions
not to annul awards. Judicial intervention is most notorious through a
provision of the intercantonal arbitration Concordat permitting annulment of
"arbitrary" awards. Because of this excessive intervention, disputes are
destined to be decided by judges rather than arbitrators, despite parties'
agreements to the contrary.
The interventionist tendency in Geneva arbitration law contrasts with the
trend toward greater arbitral autonomy in the arbitration laws of England,
France and the United States. As a result, Geneva's reputation as a hospitable site for international commercial arbitration, due to its political neutrality, general serenity and the linguistic ability of its jurists, may suffer
from its less welcoming legal climate.
Geneva's judicial preference for the "right result" defeats the objectives
of arbitration: privacy, finality and neutrality of forum in the resolution of
commercial disputes. Parties that have agreed to go before an arbitrator find
themselves before a judge. The resulting uncertainty encourages parties in
arbitration to renege on their agreements to arbitrate and seek judicial
recourse instead.
This article examines the legal framework for Geneva arbitration, focusing
on those cases in which Swiss courts have annulled international commercial
arbitration awards rendered in Geneva. The Swiss judiciary's role in the
arbitral process is analyzed in light of the desiderata of finality and privacy in
arbitral dispute resolution, and the draft revision of Swiss conflict of laws
rules that recognizes parties' rights in international arbitration to exclude
judicial intervention. The authors conclude that greater judicial restraint in
the control of international commercial arbitration in Geneva commends
itself. The judge's role should not include the rectification of simple arbitrator error. Rather, it should be limited to insuring the integrity of the
arbitral process and the rights of third parties.
II.

THE CONCORDAT

In 1969, the French-speaking cantons of Fribourg, Vaud, Valais, Neuchitel and Geneva drafted a uniform Swiss arbitration law based on
authority of the Swiss Constitution. 1 In 1974 that draft attained the federal
government's approval. 2 That law, the Concordat, applies to any arbitral
I B. VERF., CONST., COST. FED. art. 64. The twenty-six cantons within the
Helvetic Confederation retain competence over judicial organization and procedure,
and the administration of justice.
2 Concordat Suisse Sur l'Arbitrage (1974) [hereinafter cited as Cdt.] (text of
Concordat in French, German, Italian, and English, with notes in French, German,
and English by Andr6 Panchaud, published by Editions Payot, Lausanne). All
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proceeding in a signatory canton. 3
The Concordat applies to all arbitral procedings within a signatory canton, 4 where the parties so provide in a written agreement. s A "writing" is
references concerning the law of Geneva are to the Concordat unless otherwise
specified.
At this writing, twenty-one cantons have enacted the Concordat. The adhering
cantons, in alphabetical order, are Appenzell-Ausserrhoden, Appenzell-Innerrhoden, Basel-Landschaft, Basel-Stadt, Bern, Fribourg, Geneva, Grailbunden, Jura,
Neuchatel, Nidwalden, Obwalden, St. Gallen, Schaffhausen, Schwyz, Solothurn,
Ticino, Uri, Valais, Vaud, and Zug. The remaining five non-adherents are, as of
September 1, 1981, Zurich, Luzern, Glarus, Aargau and Thurgau, with ratifying
legislation being prepared in Aargau and Thurgau. International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA), 7 Y.B. COM. ARB. 70 (1982). For ratifying legislation, see
1981 Recueil officiel des lois et ordonnances de la Confed6ration suisse (ROLF) 984.
Zurich, the most important of the non-signatory cantons, retains its own arbitration
rules under the Zivilprozessordnung [hereinafter cited as ZPO]. The ZPO was
adopted on June 13, 1979 and became effective on Jan. 1, 1977. Sections 238-258 of
the ZPO deal with arbitration. Whether Zurich's law represents an approach to
arbitration different from the Concordat had been questioned by commentators. See,
e.g., Briner, Switzerland, in ICCA, 3 Y.B. COM. A"n. 181, 182-83, [hereinafter cited
as Briner], and W. Park, JudicialSupervision of TransnationalCommercialArbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 1979, 21 HARV. INT'L L. J. 87, 111 n.160.
3 Cdt., supra note 2, art. 46.
4 Cdt., id. at art. 1, para. 1. Because the Concordat applies to any arbitral
proceeding with its seat (sibge) in a signatory canton, it explicitly recognizes the

traditional doctrine of lex loci arbitri.

5 Cdt., id. at art. 6; ZPO, supra note 2, § 238 1(2). Note that all arbitration in
Geneva is subject to the Concordat which parties to arbitration may not contravene
through choice of arbitration rules or institutions.
Geneva case law recognizes the doctrine of"severability.' Under that doctrine, an
arbitration provision in a contract remains valid despite the invalidity of the main
contract. In this situation, an arbitration clause becomes void only if the clause is
subject to the same infirmity as the main contract itself. Judgment of July 7, 1962,
Bundesgericht, Switz. (President du Tribunal f6d6ral), 88 BGE I at 100, 105; Judgment of April 12, 1945, Bundesgericht (Tribunal f6d6ral, le Section Civile) Switz., 71
BGE II at 116, 1945 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX (J.T.) I at 278; Judgment of October 7,
1933, Bundesgericht (Tribunal f6d6ral, section de droit public), Switz., 59 BGE I at
171, 179. Accord ZPO, supra note 2, § 241. If for example, a contract for the
purchase of a company is held void because induced by misrepresentatioh, an
arbitration clause within that contract will not necessarily be held void. Rather, the
arbitrator will decide whether the agreement to arbitrate problems arising out of the
contract was itself induced by misrepresentation. Only if the arbitrator so finds will
the agreement to arbitrate be held void.
The Concordat permits arbitration only for certain subject matters. Disputes are
arbitrable only if they do not fall "within the exclusive jurisdiction of a State
authority by virtue of a mandatory provision of the law." Cdt., supra note 2, art. 5;
Accord ZPO, supra note 2, § 238, para. 1. As such, matters relating to labor law and
social security are not arbitrable.
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defined by general principles of law, 6 and may result from reference to the
rules of a commerical or professional institution. In all cases, parties' statement of choice for arbitral rules must refer expressly to the arbitration
7
agreement in those rules.
The Concordat contains a large number of mandatory provisions that may
interfere with arbitral proceedings. Fully two-thirds of the Concordat's
forty-six articles are designated mandatory,8 giving arbitrators and parties
far less autonomy than under the laws of other major arbitral centers. 9 These
mandatory provisions deal with matters such as the form of the arbitration
agreement, subject matter of the arbitration, revocation of arbitral authority,
and challenge of the award's validity.10 Certain of these mandatory provi6 For example, the Swiss Federal Code des Obligations and the 1958 New York
Arbitration Convention describe general principles of law.
7 Cdt., supra note 2, art. 6, para. 2; cf. ZPO, supra note 2, § 238, para. 2, not
requiring a written declaration of adhesion.
s Cdt., supra note 2, art. 1, para. 3.
9 See, e.g., Paris, France; London, England.
10 "Mandatory" provisions (dispositions imperatives) include all or part of the
following:
Article 2 (2nd and 3rd paras.) fixes the arbitral seat in absence of a choice by the
parties;
Article 4 defines an arbitration agreement;
Article 5 defines subject-matter arbitrability;
Article 6 requires arbitration agreements to be specific and in writing;
Article 7 prohibits exclusion of lawyers as arbitrators;
Article 8 grants the arbitral tribunal the jurisdiction to rule on its own competence and requires any objection to competence be raised before any defense on
the merits;
Article 9 allows immediate court appeal of interlocutory rulings on competence;
Article 12 provides for judicial appointment of arbitrators or of an "umpire"
(surarbitre)in the absence of agreement by the parties;
Article 13 defines the pendency of the arbitration (lis pendens);
Articles 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22(2) govern challenge of arbitrators;
Article 25 defines minimum procedural fairness (the right to be heard);
Article 26 gives courts exclusive power to issue binding interlocutory orders;
Article 27 provides for judicial assistance in the taking of evidence;
Aiticle 28 limits the third-party intervention in arbitration;
Article 29 governs interlocutory action on issues of set-off outside the arbitrators' mission and grants suspensive effect on arbitral proceedings to such
interlocutory action;
Article 31 (1st para.) requires all arbitrators to participate in all arbitral deliberations and decisions;
Article 33 (1st para. a-f; 2nd and 3rd paras.) governs the form of the award;
Article 36 lists grounds for challenge of the award (recours en nulliti);
Article 37 sets a 30 day time limit on recours en nullitd;
Article 38 gives challenges no suspensive effect on the arbitration unless granted
by the court at a party's request;

PREDESTINATION AND SWISS ARBITRATION LAW

sions permit such extensive judicial intervention in the arbitral process as to
undermine the autonomy of that process.
The most problematic form of judicial intervention under the Concordat
stems from its provisions permitting judges to set aside arbitral awards as
"arbitrary."'I The Concordat defines arbitrary awards in two ways: awards
constituting "a clear violation of law or equity," 1 2 and awards based on
findings "manifestly contrary to the facts. ' 13 Geneva judges have liberally
interpreted the Concordat's vague definitions of "arbitrary" acts.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE CONCORDAT BY THE CANTONAL COURT

Although an arbitration agreement normally bars judicial action on the
merits of the dispute or appeal of the award, 14 the Concordat permits
significant recourse to the courts that may not be excluded by agreement of
the parties. 15 The Concordatprovides three main avenues of intervention in
arbitral awards by the cantonal court: challenge of the arbitrator or the
arbitral tribunal as a whole ("rdcusation");1 6 application for judicial review
of the award itself ("recours en revision");17 and, action for annulment of
the award ("recours en nullitd").18 Where a party succeeds in its challenge
on any of these grounds, the arbitral award may be set aside or revised.1 9
Article 39 allows the court to remit an award to the arbitrators for correction;
Article 40 provides that the court upholding a challenge may annul all or part of
the award and remit it to the arbitrators for rehearing;
Article 41 governs judicial review (rivision) on grounds of fraud or new evidence;
Article 42 sets a time limit on application for revision;
Article 43 provides for remand of the award to the arbitrators if the revision is
granted;
Article 44 defines procedures for judicial declaration of enforceability;
Article 45 defines jurisdiction of the cantonal courts; and
Article 46 stipulates the Concordat supersedes all prior cantonal arbitration law
in the signatory cantons.
A survey of these provisions indicates that many of them relate merely to matters of
fairness or common sense.
I In French, German and Italian, the three official languages of the Concordat, the
terms are respectively, arbitraire,willkurlich, and arbitrario.Cdt., supra note 2, art.

36(f).
12 Cdt., id. at art. 36(f). Equity here is equated with fairness, and not the technical
meaning of that term in English law.
13

Id.

"Appeal" (appel) in civil law systems implies a hearing on the facts as well as
the law. "Recourse" (recours), on the other hand, involves only a review of the law.
See SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW at 424.
IS Accord, ZPO, supra note 2, § 255.
16 Cdt., supra note 2, arts. 18-23.
17 Cdt., id. at arts. 41-43.
18 Cdt., id. at arts. 36-40.
14

19 Note that the Concordat'permits interlocutory appeals on certain of these
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Methods of Cantonal Court Intervention in Arbitral Awards
1.

20
R6cusation: Challenge of the Arbitral Tribunal

The Constitutional guarantees of equal treatment before the law 21 and the
right to be heard by an impartial judge22 are the bases for rdcusation.
Considerable case law affirms the principle that arbitrators, as well as any
organization designated to appoint them, must be independent of the parties.2 3 Therefore, grounds for ricusationinclude an arbitrator's relationship
to a party or a party's representative by blood, marriage, adoption, or
24
business links.
Challenge of an arbitrator before the cantonal court may result in his
matters. Under the Concordat, arbitrators have the authority to rule on their own
jurisdiction in either an interlocutory or final decree. Cdt., supra note 2, art. 8, para.
1. All exceptions to arbitral jurisdiction must be raised before any argument on the
merits of the dispute, by an interlocutory plea to the competent court. Cdt., id. at art.
8, para. 2; art. 9, and art. 36(b). Arbitrators' decisions on matters such as their own
competence and the validity of arbitration agreements or main contracts, are subject
to immediate appeal. Cdt., id. at art. 9.
20 For a more detailed discussion of rdcusation, see Caprez, Le Concordat Sur
l'Arbitrage, 72 Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung (SJZ) 233 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Caprez] and B. DUTOIT, F. KNOEPFLER, P. LALIVE, & P. MERCIER, I REPERTOIRE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE SUISSE 276-87 (1982) [hereinafter cited as DuTOIT].
21 B. VERF., CONST., COST. FED. art. 4.
22 Id. at art. 58.
23 See DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 276-81.
24 Cdt., supra note 2, art. 18 and notes thereto;

ZPO supra note 2, § 244, para. 2.
The entire arbitral tribunal is subject to challenge if one of the parties is found to have
exercised overriding influence on the appointment of its members.
The Concordat provides challenge to an arbitrator be made at the outset of
arbitration or as soon as the objecting party becomes aware of grounds for removal.
Cdt., supra note 2, art. 20. The cantonal court may revoke the arbitrator's authority
on any of the grounds for challenge specifically enumerated or on other "valid
grounds," id. at art. 22, such as undue delay in carrying out the arbitral mission, id. at
art. 17, by the terms of the arbitration agreement. Cdt., id. at art. 29.
However, an arbitral tribunal may consist entirely of nationals of a party's home
country or domicile. DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 277. When execution of a foreign
award is sought in Switzerland, of course, the composition of the arbitral tribunal that
rendered it is subject to challenge only for violation of Swiss public policy (ordre
public). Id. at 278. Thus'the federal court has upheld foreign awards rendered by the
arbitral tribunals of organizations, professional associations, and state institutions
(for example Czechoslovakia) to which only one of the parties belongs. Id. at 279.
Parties may also challenge arbitrators' jurisdiction (rdcusation) on the basis of
bias, criminal record, or any other ground for removal of federal judicial officials. See
Articles 22 and 23 of the Bundesgesetz fiber die Organisationder Bundesrechtspflege
(loi fRdrale d'organisationjudicaire) of 16 Dec. 1943 [hereinafter cited as BGB

OJF].
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removal if "objection [is] made before any issue is raised on the merits, or as
soon as the requesting party has knowledge of the grounds for objection." 25
Because parties have a constitutional right to an impartial arbitrator, courts
have liberally interpreted this.time limit in claimant's favor. Courts will not
normally deprive a party of its right to challenge an arbitrator "so long as the
challenge is presented at a time when it will not greatly interfere with the
carrying out of the proceedings. ' 26 However, courts will reject as untimely a
challenge to even a partial arbitrator if a party clearly knows of the partiality
27
at the outset but delays challenge until he loses arbitration on the merits.
2. Recours en R6vision: Review of the Award for Fraud or New
Evidence
Parties may seek rdvision of an arbitral award by the cantonal court on two
grounds: 1) that the award was affected by criminal acts, such as fraud; or 2)
that the award was rendered in ignorance of important evidence existing
prior to the award which the claimant could not present during the proceedings. 28 Parties seeking rdvision must apply for review within sixty days of
claimant's knowledge of grounds for review, and no later than five years
after notification of the award. 29 If the action for review succeeds, the
30
cantonal court must remit the award to the arbitral tribunal for rehearing.
Case law on rdvision for criminal acts is sparse. However, in unpublished
cantonal court opinions, 31 the cantonal court in Geneva has held that it may
review arbitral cases allegedly tainted by criminal acts only where those acts
have been proven in a criminal trial prior to the rdvision. This prohibition
applies "unless the criminal jurisdiction was itself unable to rule on the
commission of the infraction, such as where defendant is deceased or has
become incompetent. ' 32 Where a party seeks rdvision claiming the arbitral
award was rendered in ignorance of important evidence, he must prove he
Such removal is called rdvocation. Cdt., supra note 2, art. 20.
supra note 20, at 283, summarizing a holding in Judgment of November
22, 1972, Bundesgericht (Tribunal f~dgral), Chambre de droit public (Switz.), 95
Semjud. 257 (1973).
27 Judgment of January 7, 1969, Tribunal de le Instance (R6publique et Canton de
Gen~ve) 1969 REvUE ARBITRAGE 108, cited in DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 285.
28 Cdt., supra note 2, art. 41. ZPO, supra note 2, § 293 is comparable, though
25

26 DuTOIT,

more generally stated.
29

30
31

Cdt., supra note 2, art. 42. Cf. ZPO, supra note 2, § 293 granting ninety days.
Cdt., supra note 2, art. 43.
Eurosystem hospitalier en faillite v. S.A. Servicios Profesionales Construcci6n,

and Socit6 G~n6rale de Banque S.A. v. Servicios Profesionales Construccirn,
[hereinafter cited as ESH en faillite and SGB SA, respectively]. Judgments of October 14, 1981, Cour de Justice Civile (Rfpublique et Canton de Gen~ve [1981],
(unpublished), cited in DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 360-63.
32 ESH en faillite, cited in DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 361.
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was unaware of the evidence during arbitral proceedings and that such
ignorance was reasonable. 33 If claimant did have knowledge of the decisive
facts, he must show he was unable, despite all diligence during the arbitration, to present evidence on these facts. 34
3. Recours en Nullit6: Setting Aside and Remitting Awards
Article 36 of the Concordat provides nine grounds for annulment of an
arbitral award.35 Arbitral decisions are subject to actions for nullification
("recoursen nulliti") where the arbitral tribunal: 1) was improperly constituted; 2) erred as to its jurisdiction; 3) ruled on matters not submitted to it; 4)
violated a party's due process rights; 36 5) awarded a party something not
claimed; 6) made an "arbitrary" award; 37 7) ruled after expiration of its
mission; 8) did not respect the provisions of the form of the award; or 9) fixed
arbitrators' fees at a manifestly excessive level. 38 Article 36 is mandatory 39
and thus not waivable by the parties, either expressely in the arbitration
33 ESH en faillite, cited in DUTOIT, id. at 362.
34 Id. The court also emphasized that rdvision

should not be confused with an
action for nullification: rdvision does not allow the presentation of new arguments
or new interpretation of facts already in evidence.
35 The parties to an arbitration agreement are free to stipulate their own contractual avenues of appeal, in addition to those guaranteed by the Concordat. Any such
private remedies must be exhausted before a party may challenge the award in court.
Cdt., supra note 2, art. 37, para. 2.
36 Cf. ZPO, supra note 2, § 281, providing for recours en nullitd for violation of
mandatory rules of procedure.
37 Cf. ZPO, supra note 2, § 281, providing for recours en nulliti against awards
which are arbitrary, based on findings contrary to the facts, or in clear violation of the
law.
Under the Concordat, the moving party has the burden of establishing that aspects
of the award are tainted with arbitrariness. Judgment of March 17, 1973, Cour de
Justice (R6publique et Canton de Gen~ve) (unpublished) cited in Caprez, supra note
20, at 234-35. Under the Concordat's Article 33, Cdt., supra note 2, art. 33, para.
l(e), the parties may waive their right to know the reasons for a given decision. The
Vaud court has recently held that such a waiver does not imply a waiver of the
right to challenge for arbitrariness. Masnata v. Wurlod, Judgment of July 1, 1975,
Chambre de Recours (Canton de Vaud), cited in Joldon, Les motives du recours en
nullite selon le Concordat Suisse sur L'Arbitrage, [1979] BERNER FESTGABE ZUM
SCHWEIZERISCHEN JURISTENTAG,

1979 at 335 [hereinafter cited as Jolidon]. A minor-

ity view, see DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 353, would forbid parties to waive their right
because without the arbitrator's reasoning, it is not possible to specify how the
arbitrator has been arbitrary. Judgment of September 5, 1974, Kantonsgericht, II.
Zivilkammer (Canton de St. Gall), 72 Schweizerische Juristen Zeitung (SJZ) 903
(1976), cited in DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 353.
38 Cdt., supra note 2, art. 36(a)-(d), (g)-(i). These grounds are treated at some
length in DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 343-59 and in Jolidon, supra note 37, at 311.
39 Cdt., supra note 2, art. 1, paras. 1 and 3.
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agreement or by reference
to institutional rules stipulating the award be final
40
or without appeal.
The action for annulment of an arbitral award on grounds of arbitrariness
under Article 36(f) is the Concordat's most potentially intrusive provision.
That provision opens arbitral proceedings to the possibility of almost unlimited judicial intervention, defining arbitrary awards as those either based on
"findings ...

manifestly contrary to the facts appearing on the file" or

constituting "a clear violation of law or equity. ' 41 Federal constitutional
decisions indicate a decision is arbitrary "when it seriously violate[s] a clear
and undisputed judicial norm or when it contradicts in a shocking manner the
concept of justice. ' 42 In spite of these definitions, the Concordat's Article
36(f) arbitrariness standard is vague. Article 36(f) has thus been subject to
different interpretations.
The cantonal court in Vaud has provided helpful guidelines for the interpretation of the Concordat's arbitrariness provisions, stating "the facts
on the fie" are only those which may be considered proven and uncontradicted by the evidence in the record, 4 3 and not those subject to weighing
or interpretation by the arbitrator. 44 In practice, however, the Vaud court
may not be following their strict standards for intervention for arbitrariness.
They occasionally find awards arbitrary for defects that might more properly
40 DUTOIT,

supra note 20, at 336, cites a series of decisions by the cantonal court

of Vaud which affirm the right to challenge awards in court despite ouster clauses in
the arbitration agreement, most recently in the Judgment of February 13, 1981. Court

decisions-whether from the same or another canton-are not binding as precedents.
They are nonetheless highly persuasive in interpreting a Concordatwhose function is

that of a Uniform Act. For a detailed discussion of the extensive case law of Vaud on
the Concordat, see L'applicationdu ConcordatIntercantonalsur l'Arbitragepar le
Tribunal Cantonal Vaudois: Dix Ans de Jurisprudence, 129 J.T. III (Special issue)
(1981 No. 3). Note, however, that under a draft revision of Swiss federal conflict of
law rules waiver of the right to request annulment is allowed in international
arbitration involving no Swiss parties. (Bundesgesetz iiber das internationalePrivatrecht) (loifiddralesur le droit internationalprivd) art. 180 [hereinafter cited as Projet
de Loi] (Authors' translation). The Projet de Loi is published in French and German
with an accompanying Commission report by Frank Vischer and Paul Volken, in 12
SCHWEIZER STUDIEN ZUM INTERNATIONALEN RECHT (ETUDES SUISSEs DE DROIT

(1978) [hereinafter cited as Vischer & Volken]. See infra discussion in Section III of text.
41 Cdt., supra note 2, art. 36(f). "Equity" is used to mean "fair" or "just" rather
than its technical sense in English.
42 Gunn v. Pluss, Judgment of October 14, 1981, Cour de Justice (R6publique et
Canton de Gen~ve), excerpted in 104 Semjud. 31-32 1982.
43 Bayerische Motoren Werke AG v. SFAM France SA, Judgment of March 21,
1978, Tribunal cantonal (Canton de Vaud), cited in DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 354,
and Jolidon, supra note 37, at 327. Accord Judgment of October 28, 1975, Tribunal
cantonal (Vaud), cited in DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 353-54.
44 BMW v. SEAM France, cited in Jolidon, supra note 37, at 327.
INTERNATIONAL)
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have been covered by other Article 36 grounds. For example, the Vaud court
has equated a gap or omission ("lacune") in the award with a manifest
contradiction of the facts, holding such a gap "arbitrary" under Article
36(t). 45 Such a defect might more properly be attacked under Article 36(c),
46
arbitral failure to rule on an item of the claim.
Differences in the interpretation of Article 36(f) may also be caused by
nuances in the text of various languages. For instance, the French version of
Article 36(t) holds an award arbitrary when it "constitutes (constitue) an
obvious violation of law or equity." The German and Italian versions'
requirements for arbitrariness, however, are more modestly satisfied if the
award "contains" (enthiilt, contiene) such a violation. Pierre Jolidon has

commented:
[I]t is perhaps only a question of simple lack of terminological cohesion.
But such an imprecision of vocabulary often implies a confusion over
the notions to which it applies, and is likely, taken alone, to lead
practitioners to errors and to useless quarrels over interpretation. 47
The Article 36(t) use of the terms "law" and "equity" also has created
much debate. 48 Observors have suggested that "law" may refer to natural
law, Swiss law, the law of the arbitration, or the law applicable on the
merits. Cantonal courts have varied opinions on this issue. One cantonal
court has concluded that although the Concordat was deliberately vague, the
relevant "law" in international arbitration is the law governing the merits of
the dispute, which is not necessarily the law of the arbitral seat. 49 Commentators 50 and courts have disagreed on the meaning of "equity." Courts in
45

Allan v. Rychetski, Judgment of January 30, 1979, Tribunal cantonal (Canton de

Vaud), cited in Du-rorr, supra note 20, at 354. In this case, a gap or omission
(lacune) in the award is equated in Vaud with a manifest contradiction of the facts
and is held arbitrary.
46 See Cdt., supra note 2, art. 36(c). The Vaud court has also held that major
mathematical errors in the award make it void for arbitrariness, Judgment of Sep-

tember 23, 1981, Tribunal cantonal (Canton de Vaud) (unpublished), cited in
DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 354, puzzling some commentators who felt the court
should first have used its Article 39 power to return the award to the arbitrator for
correction. See DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 354.
47 Jolidon, supra note 37, at 327. (Authors' translation from the French).
48 See, e.g., L'Arbitrage InternationalPrivd et la Suisse, Colloque des 2
et 3 avril
1976, organis6 par le D~partement de Droit International Priv6 de la Facult6 de Droit
de Gen~ve [hereinafter cited as Coloque], cited in Jolidon, supra note 37, at 328.
49

Judgment of November 29, 1977, Tribunal cantonal (Canton de Vaud), cited in

Jolidon, supra note 37, at 328. Vaud has also held that "law" under Article 36(t) does
not necessarily include case law, unless the award "manifestly and seriously violates
a clear and undisputed judicial principle." Judgment of October 18, 1975, Tribunal
cantonal, Chambre des recours (Canton de Vaud), cited in Jolidon, supra note 37, at

328. (Authors' translation from the French). Pierre Lalive has also taken this view. P.

Lalive, Dibats du Colloque, 120-21, cited in Jolidon, supra note 37, at 328 n.43.
50 See DuTorr, supra note 20, at 352-53 and Jolidon, supra note 37, at 330-31.
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Geneva and Vaud s have generally agreed that arbitrariness for violations of
equity may only be invoked if the arbitrator was empowered under Article 31
to rule as amiable compositeur, i.e., to decide according to his own notions

of fairness. A distinctly minority view maintains that "equity" as used in
Article 36(t) envisages more than the exceptional amiable composition
cases. 52 This view supposes that the concept expands, rather than limits, the
grounds for recours en nullitd, and empowers the court itself to consider

equity in addition to the law.
B.

Cantonal Court Interference With Arbitral Decisions

The ambiguity inherent in Article 36(f) has enabled courts to use liberally
their review power to overturn arbitral awards. 53 Indeed, while Swiss courts
seem constrained by federal precedent placing rather strict limit on the
power of the judiciary to review arbitral awards on the merits, they have in
fact subjected Swiss arbitration to a high degree of judicial intervention.
Federal court decisions suggest that simple errors in the stating of facts or
the application of law or equity do not satisfy Article 36(f)'s requirements for
appeal. 54 The Geneva court has recently reaffirmed the frequently repeated
view that to be attacked as arbitrary the award must "seriously violate a
clear and undisputed legal norm or principle or contradict in a shocking
manner the sentiment of justice." ' 55 To be set aside, the award must be so
51 See, e.g., Soci6t6 d'Etudes et de diffusion de proc6d~s et de brevets, SA
("SEDIPROB") v. Girod, Judgment of February 22, 1979, Cour de Justice (R6publique et Canton de Gen~ve), excerpted in 102 Semjud. 14 (1980). Accord Judgment of
October 28, 1975, Tribunal cantonal, Chambre des recours (Canton de Vaud), cited
in DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 352-53, Caprez, supra note 20, at 235, and Jolidon, supra
note 37, at 330-31.
52 See, e.g., Caprez, supra note 20, at 235.
53 Swiss scholars agree, see, e.g., DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 351, Caprez, supra
note 20, at 234, and Jolidon, supra note 37, at 324, that the Concordat'sdefinition of
arbitrariness under Article 36 corresponds with that of federal case law on Article IV
of the Swiss Constitution under which arbitrariness is a violation of the constitutional
guarantee of equality before the law. B. VER., CONST., COST.

FED.

art. 4 (Switz.).

The Court of Justice of Geneva follows the federal case law, see, e.g., Judgment of
June 25, 1980, Tribunal f6d6ral, Chambre de droit public (Switz.) (unpublished),
cited in DUTOIT, supra note 20, and Judgment of September 28, 1977, Tribunal
f6d6ral, Chambre de droit public (Switz.), 103 BGE Ia at 356, and agrees with the
cantonal court of Vaud. See, e.g., Judgment of October 28, 1975, Tribunal cantonal,
Chambre des recours (Canton de Vaud), cited in DuTOIT, supra note 20, at 351,
holding that the Concordat is to be interpreted in the light of federal definitions of
arbitrariness of Article IV of the Federal Constitution.
54 See, e.g., Jolidon, supra note 37, at 324.
55 Judgment of October 14, 1981, Cour de Justice (R6publique et Canton de
Gen~ve), excerpted in 104 Semjud. 31, 32 (1982). See also Judgment of February 22,
1979, Cour de Justice (Rfpublique et Canton de Gen~ve), excerpted in 102 SemJud. 24
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arbitrary as to act to the detriment of one of the parties. The Vaud and Bern
courts have further held that Article 36(f) requires proof of arbitrariness in the
result and not merely the reasoning of the award.5 6 Under this view, Article
36(f) is insufficient grounds for attack so long as the result of the award is
57
supportable.
Despite these apparent limits, courts in Geneva have construed as "arbitrary" reasonable arbitral decisions based on complicated facts. These
courts have thus paved the way for extensive judicial annulment of arbitral
awards. Three cases are illustrative here. In one case the cantonal court in
Geneva interpreted its r6le narrowly, upholding an arbitral award against a
charge of arbitrariness. Upon review, the federal court overturned as arbitrary the cantonal court decision, thereby indicating its preference for cantonal court intervention in arbitration proceedings. In the other two, the
cantonal court in Geneva adopted a more interventionist view, reversing a
substantial part of an arbitral award for arbitrariness. That decision was
upheld on review to the federal court.
The first case, Bucher-Guyer v. Meiki,5 8 involved a dispute over royalties
in a breach of a 1965 licensing agreement. Meiki, a Japanese manufacturer of
plastic-making machines, had granted Bucher-Guyer, a Zurich company, an
exclusive license to manufacture and sell certain of Meiki's machines in
Europe. The contract included an initial royalty provision set at four percent
of net sales of all Meiki products manufactured and sold by Bucher. Bucher
agreed to manufacture the machines "strictly in accordance with Meiki's
designs and specifications" and with Meiki's technical assistance.5 9 In addition, the contract provided that any dispute be settled by arbitration in
Geneva under the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.
The terms of the contract were not met. The high production costs of
Meiki's designs made marketing in Europe difficult. Bucher, therefore,
began selling a modified model. Bucher later informed Meiki: 1) of the
(1980); Judgment of October 31, 1979, Cour de Justice (R6publique et Canton de
Gen~ve) (unpublished).
56 Judgment of July 1, 1975, Tribunal cantonal (Canton de Vaud), cited in DUTOIT,
supra note 20, at 352, and Judgment of July 7, 1975, Cour d'Appel (Canton de Berne)
(uhpublished), cited in Jolidon, supra note 37, at 325 n.39. Geneva does not appear

quite so willing to save an arbitrarily reasoned award. In overturning an award as
arbitrary, the Geneva court has rejected a plea to substitute acceptable reasoning to
support the award. Judgment of October 31, 1979, Cour de Justice (R6publique et
Canton de Gen~ve) (unpublished), aff'd in Judgment of April 23, 1980, slip op.,
Tribunal f6d6ral, 16re cour de droit public (Switz.) (unpublished).
57 Jolidon, supra note 37, at 325, n. 39.
58 Judgment of May 30, 1975, Cour de Justice Civile (R6publique et Canton de
Gen~ve) (unpublished), rev'd. in part Judgment of March 17, 1976, Bundesgericht
(Tribunal f6d6ral, Chambre de droit public) (Switz.), 102 BGE la at 493; ICCA, 5
Y.B. CoM. ARa: 220 (1980) (Summary in English). (Facts summarized in English,
ICC Award in Case No. 2114, ICCA, 5 Y.B. CoM. AR3. 186 (excerpt)).
59 ICCA, 5 Y.B. COM. ARn. at 186 (1980).
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non-suitability of Meiki's machines for the European market; and 2) that
Bucher had thus been forced to design a machine in which only a small
remaining number of parts followed the Meiki design. Bucher proposed
paying the four percent royalty on these parts only, rather than on the full
net sales. Meiki refused the modification, demanding full royalties. When
these demands were not met, Meiki terminated the licensing agreement
alleging Bucher's material breach. The parties then sought arbitration.60
The arbitrator rendered an award in favor of Meiki, finding Bucher violated the terms of the contract. In addition, the arbitrator found Bucher
acted in bad faith by continuing to request and receive Meiki's blueprints,
information and assistance, after Bucher decided to change Meiki's specifications but before so informing Meiki. 61 The arbitrator thus ordered
Bucher pay Meiki both the full royalty of four percent of net price for all
machines in question sold between 1969 and 1972,62 and the arbitration costs
and filing fees. 63 In addition, the arbitrator prohibited Bucher's use of any
information acquired in any way from Meiki. Finally, the arbitrator ordered
Bucher not disclose, reveal, sell, or otherwise convey any Meiki "knowhow" to any person or allow it to be used. 64 These prohibitions applied
provided the information was not already within the public domain. 65 This
public domain limitation did not apply, however, to Bucher's manufacture
and sale of machines already within the public domain.
Bucher requested the arbitral award be set aside as "arbitrary," arguing
the award suffered from inconsistency. Bucher pointed to those parts of the
award allowing Bucher to use, sell or disclose information obtained from
Meiki if that information has entered the public domain. Bucher contrasted
those sections of the award with others prohibiting absolutely Bucher's use
of components based on Meiki's design, regardless of whether they had
fallen into the public domain. Arbitrariness, Bucher argued, resulted from
this apparent contradiction.
The cantonal court in Geneva disagreed, finding the arbitrator's reasoning
not sufficiently questionable to render the award arbitrary. 66 The cantonal
court did not consider the arbitrator's varying treatment of information and
60 Arbitration insued in Geneva before a single arbitrator, a Canadian appointed by
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Court of Arbitration. The parties
agreed to the application of Swiss federal choice of law rules. Id. at 189. The
arbitrator found the contract governed by the Swiss Civil Code since Switzerland was
the place of contract performance. Id.
61 "[W]ithin record time," wrote the arbitrator, "...
the defendant [Bucher],
which has never manufactured this type ... of machine, came up with its own
machine." I.C.C. Case No. 2114, summarized in ICCA, 5 Y.B. COM. AIn. 186, 190
(1980).
62 These royalties amounted to about 1 million Swiss francs.
63 5 Y.B. COM. ARB. 186, 191 (1980).
64 Id. at 192.
65

Id.

66

Id. at 220, 223 (1980).
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machines within the public domain as a grave violation of uncontradicted
legal principles or shockingly contrary to sentiments of justice. On appeal,
the federal court found the cantonal court decision on the arbitral award was
67
itself arbitrary on this point, and reversed and remanded the case.
The second case, Socigt, Tunisienne d'Electricit et du Gaz (STEG) v.
Socitd Entrepose,68 (Entrepose), involved a construction contract between

a French company, Entrepose, and a Tunisian state agency, STEG, for a
three hundred kilometer natural gas pipeline. The contract provided disputes
be arbitrated before the International Chamber of Commerce, (ICC), and
Tunisian substantive law be applied in such arbitration. Entrepose failed to
meet the contract's construction deadline and demanded damages totaling
over ten million French francs, claiming STEG's actions precluded Entrepose's fulfillment of the contract.6 9 Entrepose thereafter sought arbitra70
tion.
On certain procedural issues, the cantonal court found for STEG, holding
STEG had been denied its "rights to be heard" 71 on the issue of damages of
over FF 1,000,000 ordered by the arbitrator against STEG for Entrepose's
costs in maintaining idle work crews in Tunisia during delays. The cantonal
72
court thus held the arbitral award arbitrary.
More important than the proceedural issues, however, is the cantonal
court's treatment of the alleged substantive errors. The arbitrator found for
Entrepose citing STEG's: 1)failure to acquire land needed by Entrepose for
work sites along the route of the pipeline; 73 2) failure to supply Entrepose
with necessary timely administrative permits; 74 3) withholding of reimbursement for expenses and taxes incurred by Entrepose; 75 and 4) failure to
supply certain construction equipment necessitated by severe weather conditions. 76 The arbitrator found STEG's last omission most weighty, issuing a
67

Id.

Judgment of October 31, 1979, Cour de Justice Civile, 3e Section, No. 320
(R6publique et Canton de Gen~ve) (unpublished).
69 Id., slip op. at 3.
70 Entrepose initially sought arbitration in 1973. STEG vigorously resisted arbitration over several years on a variety of grounds including pendency of an eventually
unsuccessful interlocutory appeal to the Tunisian courts. Id., slip op. at 6.
71 See Cdt., supra note 2, art. 25.
72 STEG v. Entrepose, supra note 68, slip op. at 72-73. The Court found the
68

arbitral tribunal's failure to consider STEG's evidence on this issue to violate the
Concordat'sArticles 25(a) and 36(0. Id. Noting that the party involing Article 36(f)

must normally establish that the award "is based on an interpretation or understanding manifestly unsupportable by the law," id., slip op. at 57, the cantonal court
nonetheless shifted this burden to Entrepose requiring it to prove the award was
reasonable. See Cdt., supra note 2, art. 33, para. l(e).
73 Id., slip op. at 60.
74 Id., slip op. at 62.
75 Id., slip op. at 77-80.
76 Id., slip op. at 20 and 66-68.
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4,321,87177 out of a total award of FF
damage award against STEG of FF
78
costs.
and
interest
plus
8,598,432
The arbitrator's finding that STEG had failed to supply certain construction equipment necessitated by severe weather conditions was the basis for
the cantonal court's interference with and overturning of the arbitral award.
During arbitration, Entrepose had claimed damages for delays caused by a
lack of special equipment and by severe rain, specifically charging STEG
liable for its failure to supply a loading crane. STEG responded that under
Tunisian law it was not responsible for damages whose cause was beyond its
control. The arbitrator, using discretion granted him by the Tunisian Code
des Obligations,79 agreed with STEG and based the damage figure soley on
an assessment of STEG's fault in failing to supply certain other equipment
not required by the unforeseen weather conditions. The cantonal court in
Geneva held, however, that the cited provision in the Tunisian Code was
insufficient support for the award. The award was thus arbitrary because it
violated a "clear and undisputed legal norm or principle." 80 In so holding,
the cantonal court seemed to disregard its observation that "arbitrariness
does not arise from the mere fact that another solution would be conceivable
or even preferable." 8 1 The cantonal court ruling in favor of cantonal court
82
interference with arbitration was upheld on appeal to the federal court.
In Berardiv. Clair,83 discussed in more detail later, the balance sheet of a
Gabonese company was at issue. The company's shares had been sold by a
Canadian (Berardi) to a Frenchman (Clair). The arbitrator awarded the
seller.23 million French francs. The Geneva cantonal Cour de Justice later
annulled the award as "arbitrary," substituting its own conclusions about
the balance sheet's accuracy for those of the arbitrators.
The practical effect of the annulment was felt in Paris, where three months
7 The United States dollar value of the award at the time of its issuance was
$1,000,000.
78 STEG v. Entrepose, supra note 68, slip op. at 20.
79 "Damages are the affected loss that the creditor has sustained and the gain of
which he is deprived which are the direct consequence of the inexecution of the
obligation. Interpretation of special circumstances in each individual case is left to
the discretion [literally, prudence] of the Tribunal; it must evaluate differently the
measure of damages according to whether it is a question of the debtor's fault or his
fraud." Code des Obligations (CO) art. 278, para. 1 (Tunisia), cited in Judgment of
October 31, 1979, slip op. at 67, Cour de Justice (R6publique et Canton de Gen~ve),
(Authors' translation from the French).
80 STEG v. Entrepose, supra note 68, slip op. at 55, 3e Section.
81 Id., slip op. at 55.
82 For a discussion of the Federal court decision in Entrepose, see infra text
accompanying notes 109-12.
83 Berardi v. Clair, Judgment of April 23, 1980, Bundesgericht (Tribunal f~d6ral,
16re Cour de droit public), (Switz.) (unpublished), aff'g sub nora., Clair v. Berardi,
Judgment of Oct. 31, 1979, Cour de Justice (R6publique et Canton de Gen~ve)
(unpublished).
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earlier the Tribunal de Grande Instance had granted leave to enforce the
award. On learning of the award's annulment, the Cour d'Appel of Paris
quashed the lower court's decision. The parties had stipulated arbitration
under the 1955 version of the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, which provides that gaps in the procedural rules be filled according to
the law of the country of the proceedings. The 1975 Rules, by contrast,
provide for such gaps to be filled by the arbitrator. The Cour d'Appel noted
that the 1955 Rules created an attachment of the proceedings to Swiss law.
However, the court rested its decision on Article V(1)(e) of the New York
Convention, permitting refusal of recognition to awards set aside by a
competent authority of the country where rendered. Although the language
of Article V(1)(e) is permissive rather than mandatory ("recognition ...
may be refused") the Court considered itself obligated to refuse recognition:
"execution of the award must be refused upon proof that the award has been
set aside ...

."

("l'execution d'une sentence arbitral doit 8tre refus6e

lorsque la preuve est fournie que la sentence a 6t annull6e .... ").84
The cantonal court decisions in Entrepose, Berardi, and Bucher-Guyer
may raise doubt as to the practical effect of declarations of Swiss courts
purporting to protect arbitration from judicial interference on the merits of
disputes. In Entrepose and Berardi, the federal court on appeal affirmed the
cantonal court's interference in the arbitral decision, finding the cantonal
court's substitution of its own interpretation of Tunisian law quite proper as
was the overturning of the award as arbitrary. Similarly, the federal court in
Bucher-Guyer encouraged cantonal court interference with the merits of
arbitral decisions in holding the cantonal court should have overturned the
arbitral award as arbitrary because of the arbitrator's varying treatment of
information and machinery. One may question whether such interference in
the merits of arbitral awards is appropriate in light of the fact that in both
cases there existed reasonable grounds for the arbitrators' decisions.
IV.

FEDERAL JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

In theory, the Swiss federal court respects the independence of the arbitral
process. 85 A survey of Swiss federal court decisions reviewing arbitral
awards, however, indicates that federal courts have not always respected
this principle.

84

Id., slip op. at 6.

The federal court may determine only whether the cantonal court has performed
its task of examining the award for arbitrariness in a manifestly unjustifiable manner.
85

Thinen v. Niederer, cited in

DUTOIT,

supra note 20, at 367.
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Proceduresfor Federal Court Challenge

A.

Parties may seek federal court intervention in Swiss arbitration following
8 6
cantonal court review by challenge of the cantonal judge's decision. A
cantonal decision is subject to federal challenge only when final, unless 8an
7
interlocutory cantonal decision would cause irreparable damage to a party.
1.

Challenges to the Cantonal Judges' Decision on the Arbitral Award

Challenges to the cantonal decision on the arbitral award take the form of
recours de droit public heard by the Administrative and Constitutional
Chamber (cour de droit public) of the federal court. Through recours en
reforme, parties challenge cantonal action for violation of federal statutory
court does not generally accept a recours en reforme to an
law.8 8 The federal
89
arbitration.
The frequently successful route for federal challenge to the cantonal
90
judges' decision on the arbitral award is the recours de droit public. This
The Swiss federal court may hear appeals from decisions or decrees of the
cantonal courts. BGB (OJF),supra note 24, art. 84, para. 1. There is no procedure for
direct appeal of an arbitral award to a non-cantonal tribunal. Note that an arbitral
decision rendered by ajudge acting as an arbitrator is of course a private award, not a
public decree. DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 364. For a discussion of the freedom of
sitting judges to serve as arbitrators in Switzerland, see Wenner, Swiss Judges as
Arbitrators or as Nominatorsfor Arbitrators, 35 ARB. J. 22 (1980).
Note that in both types of federal court appeals, parties are challenging only the
cantonal court's interpretation of an arbitral decision and not the arbitral decision
itself.
87 A party's claim that a cantonal court challenge will delay the final award and
thereby increase the cost of arbitration is not sufficient grounds for an interlocutory
appeal to the federal court. BGB (OJF), supra note 24, art. 87, cited in Briner,
Switzerland (update of National Report), ICCA, 7 Y.B. COM. ARB. 70, 73 [hereinafter cited as Briner Update]; DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 366-67.
In Allan v. Rychetski, Judgment of December 4, 1979, Bundesgericht, Switz., 105
BGE Ibat 431, (1980) 70 Praxis des Schweitzerischen Bundesgerichts 737, cited in
DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 366-68, the federal court reaffirmed its prior decisions on
the nature of "irreparable damage." To be irreparable, the damage must be incapable
of subsequent reversal, even by an eventual final award in the claimant's favor. See
DUTOIT, id. at 366. The mere possibility of such harm establishes grounds for appeal
but the damage must be of a legal, rather than factual nature. DUTOIT, id. at 367.
88 See, e.g., Jugomineral v. Grillo Werke AG, Judgment of March 17, 1975,
Bundesgericht (Tribunal f~d~ral, l6re Cour Civile), (Switz.), 101 BGE II at 168, 1975
J.T. I at 629; [1976] 103 JOURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL [J. DR. INT.] [Clunet]
729 (dismissing a recours en reforme as inadmissible on a question of arbitration
law).
89 See DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 364-65.
90 Recours de droit public is a form of cassation. In civil law jurisdictions following the French model, cassation is a form of review distinct from appeal (appel).
Appel may involve review of the facts as well as law, and the taking of new evidence.
86
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type of appeal is available where the cantonal court violates: 1) constitutional rights (applicable in all trial type procedures including arbitration); 2)
an intercantonal Concordat; 3) an international treaty to which Switzerland
is a party; or 4) its jurisdictional powers. 9 1 In all cases of recours de droit
public appeals, the decision of the cantonal court may be remanded for
rehearing.
2. Challenge to the Cantonal Judges' Execution of the Arbitral Award
The most significant number of federal appeals in such cases alleges cantonal court "arbitrariness". 92 In these appeals, federal court review is in
theory limited to the cantonal court's decision; the federal court may not
review the arbitral award itself.93 The federal court is empowered to determine only whether the cantonal court has performed its task of examining
the award for arbitrariness in a manifestly unjustifiable manner. 94 In practice, however, the federal court does not adhere to these jurisprudential
limits on review. Instead, it examines the merits of awards when it chooses.
The federal court's tendency to examine the merits of the awards may be
an unavoidable result of its power to overturn cantonal courts for arbitrariness. To determine cantonal court arbitrariness, the federal court must
examine the subject matter of cantonal decisions, the arbitral award, for
evidence of arbitrariness. Only after so doing are judges able to rule on the
reasonableness of the cantonal court's decision.
B.

Federal Case Law IllustratingFederal Court Intervention

Swiss case law suggests that the federal court is predisposed to intervene
and overturn arbitral awards in two ways. First, the federal court overturns
The Cour d'Appel may choose to revise the lower court judgment itself or to remand

it for a new trial. In contrast, the Cour de Cassation reviews only strictly defined
questions of law and is not empowered to enter its own decision. If the Cour de
Cassation rules for the appellant, the case is remanded for a new trial. For further
treatment of cassation and appel, see A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL
LAW

SYSTEM (2d ed. 1977) at 102-08.

91 BGB (OJF), supra note 24, art. 84, para. 1. For the German text and an English
translation of Art. 84, para. 1., see Switzerland (Court Decisions), ICCA, 6 Y.B.

CoM. ARB. 151, 152 n. 5 (1981). Federal courts will hear such appeals only where
fault is attributed to the cantonal court rather than the arbitral tribunal.
92

"Arbitrariness" in cantonal court decisions, is a violation of Article IV of The

Swiss Constitution. B. VERF., CONST., COST. FED. art. 4.
93 See DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 367-68, Caprez, supra note 20, at 236. In Th~nen
v. Niederer, Judgment of March 8, 1974, Bundesgericht, Switz. (unpublished), cited
in DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 367, the Court professed to be "doubly restrained" in

such a case.
94

The federal court may determine only whether the cantonal court has performed

its task of examining the award for arbitrariness in a manifestly unjustified manner.
Thinen v. Niederer, cited in DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 367. (Authors' translation
from the French).
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cantonal court decisions upholding awards. Second, the federal court upholds cantonal court decisions overturning awards.
1. Federal Court's Overturning Cantonal Court Affirmation of Arbitral
Awards
Federal court willingness to overturn a cantonal decision upholding an
arbitral award is illustrated in Bucher-Guyer v. Meiki Co. Ltd. (BucherGuyer).95 As discussed earlier, Meiki claimed Bucher-Guyer used know-how
acquired under license from Meiki in contravention of the parties' licensing
agreement and Federal Law on Unfair Competition. 96 The arbitrator ruled in
favor of Meiki. That decision was affirmed by the cantonal court. However,
on review, the federal court reversed and remanded the cantonal court
judgment affirming the arbitral award.
The federal court reviewed the arbitrator's reasoning, examining his interpretation of the Federal Law on Unfair Competition, as well as his
interpretation of the case law under the statute. The federal court criticized
the cantonal court's failure to consider defects in the arbitrator's decision.
In judging the propriety of the cantonal court's action, the federal court
examined the merits of the arbitral decision. The federal court first examined
the arbitrator's finding that Bucher violated its "obligation of good faith" by
continuing to acquire information from Meiki. 97 The federal court held the
award arbitrary because neither the arbitrator nor the cantonal court explained how the obligation of good faith applied to the case. 98 The federal
court felt the arbitrator's use of the "good faith obligation" required explanation because that obligation is subjective by nature and lacks a "clear and
undisputed legal norm or principle." 99 The federal court's reasoning here
yields a highly interventionist approach contrary to the federal court's stated
preference for limited intervention. 100 Indeed, the court's reasoning suggests
that it will set aside awards as arbitrary where the arbitrator's award is based
on incomplete reasoning not clarified by the cantonal court even though that
reasoning may be correct.
9s Judgment of March 17, 1976, Bundesgericht (Tribunal f6d6ral, Chambre de droit
public) (Switz.), 102 BGE Ia at 493 (Bucher-Guyerv. Meiki); 1979 J.T. I at 63; [1977]
98 Semjud. 176; ICCA, 5 Y.B. CoM. Aiu. 220-24 (1980) (Summary in English), rev'g
in part Judgment of May 30, 1975, Cour de Justice (R6publique et Canton de Gen~ve)
(unpublished).
96 Loifidrale sur la concurrancediloyale du 30 septembre 1943 [hereinafter cited
as LCD].
97 LCD, id. at art. 1, para. 2. For a factual discussion of Bucher's continued use of
Meiki information, see supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
98 Bucher-Guyer v. Meiki, supra note 95, 102 BGE Ia at 506.
99 See, e.g., Judgment of October 31, 1979, Cour de Justice (Gen~ve), slip op. at
55 and cases as cited.
100 See Thdnen v. Niederer, supra note 93.
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The federal court in Bucher-Guyer also ruled the arbitrator improperly
interpreted the major case law on the subject. 101 This ruling is questionable
for two reasons. First, case law is subject to varying reasonable interpretations. As such, federal courts should defer to arbitral interpretations of case
law unless those interpretations are based on a clear and manifest error or
create a shockingly unjust result.10 2 Second, federal court failure to defer to
arbitral interpretations results in unnecessary intervention in Swiss arbitration.
2. Federal Court Willingness to Uphold Cantonal Reversal of
Arbitral Awards
The federal court has demonstrated a willingness to uphold cantonal court
decisions overturning arbitral awards. Four years after Bucher-Guyer, the
federal court considered two cases that illustrate a predisposition to accept
judicial intervention in Swiss arbitration.
Berardi v. Clair,103 as discussed earlier, involved the sale of company
shares from a Canadian (Berardi) to a Frenchman (Clair). The contract
provided for the parties' purchase and transfer of shares in installments
through a nominee in Paris. In the course of the transfer, Clair claimed the
company's annual report contained misrepresentations that fraudulently
induced purchase of the company's shares. Clair invoked the arbitration
clause of the sales agreement, demanding modification of the agreement and
damages from Berardi. Berardi claimed that he was absolved from liability
because the report had been approved by a vote of the stockholders. An
arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of Berardi, finding the stockholders' ratification of Berardi's actions freed Berardi of liability in a suit by Clair. The
arbitrator thus dismissed all claims by Clair. The cantonal court reversed the
arbitrator's decision for arbitrariness.10 4
The federal court in the Berardi appeal10 5 upheld the cantonal court's
decision to annul the arbitral award. In so doing, the federal court affirmed
101

The federal court found most damaging the "contradiction" resulting from a

failure to include a necessary phrase in a non-monetary part of the award. The
arbitrator had prohibited use of the licensor's know-how subject to the reservation
that such know-how not be in the public domain. Bucher-Guyer v. Meiki, supra note
95, 102 BGE Ia at 493, 506-08. The arbitrator neglected to add a similar limitation on
the prohibition of use of components based on the licensor's design. Under the

federal court's interpretation of case law, this "contradiction" was fatal to the

cantonal judgment in spite of the fact that the arbitrator's award could be construed
to contain a limitation on the prohibition of use of the components, and thus noncontradictory.
102 See Cdt., supra note 2, art. 36(f).
103

Berardi v. Clair, supra note 83.

Clair v. Berardi, Judgment of October 31, 1979, Cour de Justice Civile (R6publique et Canton de Gen~ve) (unpublished).
104

10s Berardi v. Clair, supra note 83, slip op. at 7.
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the implication in Bucher-Guyer 0 6 that defectively reasoned awards will
fail. The federal court stated that cantonal courts may either substitute
acceptable reasoning for defectively reasoned arbitral decisions, or set aside
such defectively reasoned awards as arbitrary. 10 7 After affirming the cantonal court's reversal of the arbitral award, the federal court suggested strict
limits on its right to overturn a cantonal court's decision to annul an award,
stating "[tlhe jurisdiction of the Federal Court, called on to examine the
application of Article 36(f) of the Concordat, is... restrained with regard to
the arbitral award: it must examine only whether the cantonal court failed in
an unendurable fashion in its duty to examine if the award is tainted with
arbitrariness." '1 0 8 In so doing, the federal court limited its power to examine
details of the arbitral decision on the merits to situations where the cantonal
court insufficiently considered the issue of arbitrariness.
The federal court's approach in Berardiis instructive and important in its
willingness to defer to cantonal court decisions overturning arbitral awards
as arbitrary. Other federal court decisions have followed this approach, 10 9
affirming cantonal court decisions to overturn arbitral awards. The court
defers to cantonal findings of defectively reasoned awards even though there
may be acceptable reasoning for the arbitral award.
In the second case, Socidte Entrepose v. Societe Tunisienne d'Electricite
et du Gaz, 110 (Entrepose),111 the federal court acted in accordance with its
decision in Berardi. Affirming the cantonal court decision, the federal court
again demonstrated its deference to cantonal court intervention annulling an
arbitral award. This ruling was made despite the court's recognition of
Bucher-Guyer v. Meiki, supra note 95, 102 BGE Ia at 493, 506-08.
The federal court stated, "[t]he cantonal court applying Article 36(f) of the
Concordat may substitute new reasons for the arbitrary reasoning of the arbitral
tribunal... but it is not obliged to do so." Berardiv. Clair,supra note 83, slip op. at
7. (emphasis added) (Authors' translation from the French).
108 Id., slip op. at 6 (Authors"translation from the French), interpreting B. VERF.,
CONST., COST. FED. art. 4. The double obstacle to arbitrariness provided: in Article
IV of the Constitution was criticized in the federal sequel to Entrepose, supra note
68. Soci6t6 Entreprose v. Soci6t6 d'Electricit6 et du Gaz, (Entrepose), Judgment of
November 26, 1980: Bundesgericht (Tribunal f~d~ral, 1re Cour de droit public),
(Switz.), (unpublished), cited in DUTOIT, supra note 20, at 368.
109 See Jolidon, supra note 37, at 325 for a discussion of the case law in Bern and
Vaud illustrating federal court willingness to defer to cantonal court decisions overturning arbitral awards as arbitrary.
110 Supra note 108. For a discussion of the facts, see text accompanying notes
68-70.
I Both parties to the cantonal court's decision in Socidtd Tunisienne d'Electricite
du Gaz v. Societe Entrepose, supra note 68, appealed that decision to the federal
court. Each party alleged constitutional rights violations under recours de droit
public. BGB (OJF), supra note 24, art. 84, para. 1. See supra text accompanying
notes 90-91 for a discussion of recours de droit public. The federal court joined the
two appeals in Entrepose, supra note 108.
106

107
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grounds upon which the cantonal decision could have been reversed. Indeed, the federal court explicitly recognized that they could have interpreted
the statute of limitations as precluding cantonal review. The court stated,
however, it would not overturn a cantonal decision as arbitrary on a procedural technicality where the cantonal error was on the side of caution.' 1 2
The federal court in Entrepose denied both parties' challenge of "arbitrar'iness" on the merits. The court rejected outright Entrepose's assertions
that: 1) the cantonal court erred in finding the arbitrator failed to consider
relevant evidence; and 2) the cantonal court's award was unnecessarily low
because based on insufficient reasoning. The court also rejected the claims
of the Soci6t6 Tunisienne d'Electricit6 et du Gaz' (STEG) that: 1) the
cantonal court erred in failing to find the arbitral award violated STEG's
right to be heard; and 2) the arbitral award lacked sufficient reasoning. The
federal court held STEG estopped in these challenges because it had consistently declined to present its evidence to the arbitrator.1 1 3
In each of the above cases, the federal court has shown a lack of deference
for arbitral decisions and a predisposition to impose its will on arbitral
awards. Not surprisingly, federal court respect for cantonal decisions depends on the cantonal courts' deference to the arbitral process. Where
cantonal courts overturn arbitral awards as arbitrary, federal court decisions
seem quite willing to defer to cantonal reasoning. For instance, in Berardi
and Entrepose, the federal court refused to engage in independent analysis,
accepting the cantonal courts' decisions to overturn the arbitral award.
However, where cantonal courts have upheld arbitral awards, the federal
court is likely to independently analyze the awards and overturn them as
arbitrary. This situation is illustrated by cases like Bucher-Guyer where the
federal court looks behind the cantonal court's decision, substituting its own
conclusions for those of the cantonal court.' 14
112 Entrepose, supra
113
114

note 108, slip op. at 22-23.

Id. at 17-20.

The high degree ofludicial intervention in Switzerland is due in large part to the
federal court's determination that arbitration is governed by procedural rather than
contract law. J6rg v. Jbrg, Judgment of May 28, 1915, Bundesgericht (Tribunal
f~d6ral 1re Section civile), 41 BGE II at 534; 1915 J.T. I at 610. The federal court
overturned its earlier view that arbitration was a private contractual matter governed
by federal law. The court held the arbitral agreement a contract of procedure rather

than substantive law because the parties had accepted a dispute resolution mechanism replacing the courts. See

DUTOIT,

supra note 20, at 254. This holding, placing

arbitration within the jurisdiction of the cantons, has been repeatedly upheld since
1915.
The view that procedural law governs arbitration has been strongly criticized by
some commentators. See, e.g., P. Lalive, Chronique de la Jurisprudence Suisse:
Jugomineralv. Guillo-Werke A.G., [1976] 103 J. DR. INT. [Clunet] 729, 730-32 [hereinafter cited as P. Lalive onJugomineral].The power that this procedural view gives
to the cantonal courts of the seat of arbitration is especially troublesome in international arbitration, where the arbitral proceedings are held in a jurisdiction with no
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In Berardi,Entrepose, and Bucher-Guyer, the federal court's deference or
lack thereof, to the cantonal courts' decisions indicates a lack of respect for
arbitral independence and a predeliction for judicial interference in spite of
seemingly limited jurisdiction.
V.

THE DRAFT REVISION OF FEDERAL CONFLICTS LAW

A commission of experts has recently prepared a revised codification of
conflict of law rules, which the Swiss (as in Continental legal systems
generally) refer to as "private international law." 115 Title Eleven of the
Projet de Loi includes provisions on international arbitration'1 6 limiting
court intervention in international commercial arbitral proceedings conducted within Switzerland.1 1 7 The Projet de Loi attempts to alleviate some
legal contracts to the dispute. In a series of cases involving execution of foreign
awards in Switzerland, the federal court has recognized the importance of the
contractual view of international arbitration, giving effect to the will of the parties.
See, e.g., Judgment of July 1, 1970, Bundesgericht (Tribunal f~d6ral, Cour de droit
public), Switz., 96 BGE I at 334, 1972 J.T. I at 27; Judgment of May 3, 1967,
Bundesgericht (Tribunal f~d~ral, Chambre de droit public), (Switz.), 93 BGE I at
265; 1968 J.T. I at 217; ICCA, 1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 200 (1976) (Summary in English);
Judgment of January 25, 1967, (Bundesgericht Tribunal f~dral, Chambre de droit
public), (Switz.), 93 BGE I at 49, 1968 J.T. I at 215, 89 SemJud. 433 (1976). This
debate over judicial interventionism has led to an effort to reform the Swiss law of
arbitration as to proceedings with an international character.
11s Projet de Loi, supra note 40. For a discussion in English of the Projet de Loi as
a whole, see McCaffrey, Swiss Draft Conflicts Law, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 235 (1980).
116 Projet de Loi, supra note 40, Title 11, arts. 171-72.
117 Title Eleven of the Projet de Loi applies to all international arbitration with its
"seat" in Switzerland. Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 171. Article 171 defines
international arbitration as involving at least one party "whose domicile, habitual
residence, or place of business is outside of Switzerland." Id. at para. 1. This
domicile oriented characterization of international arbitration is comparable to that in
English arbitration law requiring at least one foreign party. Arbitration Act, 1979, c.
42, § 3(7). By contrast, French arbitration law focuses on the subject matter of the
arbitration, defining arbitration as international if it implicates international commercial interests." Decree No. 81-500 of May 12, 1981, art. 1492, [1981] Journal Officiel
de la R~publique Frangaise (J.O.) 1398, 1402 (Fr.).
The procedural provisions of the Projetde Loi are not unlike those of the Concordat. For instance, under both the Concordat and the Projet de Loi parties have the
option of designating the arbitral procedure, either directly or by reference to the
rules of a designated organization, Cdt., supra note 2, art. 6 and art. 24, para. 1;
Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 175, para. 1, subject to certain mandatory procedural normative dispositions. Cdt., supra note 2, art. 25; Projetde Loi, supra note
40, art. 175, para. 1 and arts. 175-80. In addition, under both the Concordat and the
Projet de Loi, the arbitral tribunal is to designate procedural rules if the parties fail to
do so. Cdt., supra note 2, art. 24, para. 1; Projetde Loi, supra note 40, art. 175, para.
2. Absent designation of rules by either the parties or the arbitrator, the Concordat

24

BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2: 1

of the problems arising under the Concordat, by striking a balance between
respect for parties' need for finality in private dispute resolutions and the
maintenance of a minimum but indispensable degree of judicial control.' 18
stipulates application of the Federal Act on Civil Procedure by analogy, Cdt., supra
note 2, art. 24, para. 2, while the Projet de Loi would apply by analogy the cantonal
law of the arbitral seat, Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 175, para. 2, which, in
twenty-one of the cantons would include the Concordat. The parties may, under
either system, authorize the arbitrator to rule as amiable compositeur. Cdt., supra
note 2, art. 31, para. 3; Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 175, para. 3. The arbitrator
under the Projet de Loi would be able to seek judicial assistance, as under the
Concordat. Cdt., supra note 2, arts. 3 and 27; Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 176.
Title Eleven of the Projet de Loi briefly summarizes in one Article, Article 170, the
most important areas of possible judicial assistance, which the Concordat covers in
six articles, Cdt., supra note 2, arts. 18-23: denomination, exclusion, removal and
replacement of arbitrators, as well as the extension of their mandate. Both laws
provide for the optional deposit of the award with the appropriate court of the arbitral
seat. Cdt., supra note 2, art. 44; Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 181. However, the
Projet de Loi adds an important new international arbitration alternative permitting
arbitral tribunals to issue certificates equivalent to the award's deposit with the
court. Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 181, para. 2. This provision simplifies the
various cantonal procedures and fee schedules for deposit and certification of enforceability.
The Projet de Loi's limits of arbitrability also differ somewhat from the Concordat's. For instance, the Concordat provides, with certain exceptions, that "arbitration may relate to any right to which the parties may freely dispose." Cdt., supra
note 2, art. 5. By contrast, the Projet de Loi provides only property-related claims
may be subject to international arbitration, "Toute cause qui est de la nature patrimoniale." Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 172, para. 1. This proposed limitation is
designed to protect states' direct interest in non-property rights. Vischer & Volken,
supra note 40, at 361.
The Projet de Loi recognizes the increasing importance of international arbitration
between private corporations and foreign states. It thus expressly provides that a
state party to an arbitral agreement "may not invoke its own law to contest the
arbitrability of the dispute covered by the arbitral agreement." Projet de Loi, supra
note 40, art. 172, para. 2. By contrast, the Concordat places no limits on states
concluding arbitration agreements.
The Projet de Loi is similar to the Concordatin requiring the arbitration agreement
to be in writing. Cdt., supra note 2, art. 6; Projetde Loi, supra note 40, art. 173, para.
1. Yet, the Projet de Loi resolves the controversy left open by the Concordat's
Article 6 as to whether an exchange of telegrams or telexes may constitute a valid
writing. See Briner, supra note 2, at 185. (Briner suggests that such an exchange is
not a valid contract under the Concordat). The Projet de Loi expressly validates an
agreement either signed by the parties or "contained in an exchange of letters,
telegrams, or telexes." Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 173, para. 1. An arbitration
agreement is valid under the proposed revision so long as it satisfies the conditions of
either the law chosen by the parties to govern the principal contract, or Swiss law.
Projet de Lot, supra note 40, art. 173, para. 2.
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Three of the Projet de Loi's provisions are particularly relevant here: 1) a
provision limiting parties' right to court challenge of the arbitral award; 2) a
provision limiting parties' right to court challenge of arbitrator competence;
and 3) a provision empowering parties to waive their right to court challenge.
A.

Limiting Parties' Right to Challenge of the Arbitral Award

The Projet de Loi limits to two the grounds for challenge of an international arbitral award rendered in Switzerland: 1) denial of justice (ddni de
19 The first ground
justice); and 2) arbitrariness (arbitraire).1
covers mandatory procedural protections, providing appeal where these protections are
violated. The second ground covers the content of the awards, providing
challange for arbitrariness as required by the special needs of international
arbitration. The Projet de Loi requires designation of a single court in each
120
canton to hear all recours en nullit6.

B.

Parties' Right to Challenge of Arbitral Competence

The Projet de Loi provides, like the Concordat,121 that the arbitral tri22
bunal may rule on its own competence subject to an interlocutory appeal.1
To prevent abuse, the Projetde Loi checks this challenge in two ways. First,
it requires parties contesting arbitral competence to raise objections before
presenting any arguments on the merits of the case. 123 Second, Article 178 of
the Projet de Loi requires each canton to designate a single competent
authority to decide challenges to arbitral jurisdiction. 124
C.

Party Waiver of the Right to Challenge Awards

The Projetde Loi's most far-reaching proposal empowers parties to waive
by written agreement their right to judicial recourse.125 This provision stands
in sharp contrast to the Concordat's absolute prohibition on waiver of
parties' right to judicial challenge,1 26 which has permitted abusive delay and
overburdened the court system.

118
"19
120
121
122
123

Vischer & Volken, supra note 40, at 360.
Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 179.
Id.
Cdt., supra note 2, art. 8.
Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 178, paras. 1 and 2.
Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 177, para. 1; cf. Cdt., supra note 2, art. 8,

para. 2.
124

125
126

Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 178, para. 3.
Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 180, para. 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
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In an attempt to permit maximum arbitral independence and relieve courts
of unnecessarily heavy caseloads, Article 180 permits contractual exclusion
of challenge of an award where neither party is a domiciliary, habitual
resident or owner of a place of business in Switzerland. 2 7 The limitations in
the waiver provision appear mandated by Article IV of the Swiss Federal
Constitution. 28 In keeping with this provision, the Projet de Loi provides
waiver only where neither of the parties may be considered Swiss.129 This
waiver ensures that Swiss courts are not burdened
with ruling on dilatory
1 30
appeals having no real link with Switzerland.
As with the other Projet de Loi proposals, Article 180 serves to limit
excessive judicial intervention now existing under the Concordat. In so
doing, the Projet de Loi may better protect the effectiveness of Swiss
arbitration, thereby preserving the attractiveness of Switzerland as a site for
international arbitration. The international commercial community can only
welcome the Projet de Loi's attempts to protect the autonomy of the arbitral
process.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Judicial annulment of arbitral awards rendered in Geneva diminishes the
city's attractiveness as a site for the non-judicial resolution of international
business disputes. Businessmen seeking finality and privacy in commercial
arbitration have been surprised and dismayed to find that the Intercantonal
Arbitration Concordat permits judges to set aside awards they perceive as
containing errors of fact or law. This is particularly so because the cantonal
Cour de Justice possesses powers wide enough to justify almost any intervention in the arbitral process. No specific guidelines delineate the circumstances justifying exercise of the court's powers to annul an award as
"arbitrary," "contrary to facts," or a "violation of law or equity."1 3'
Patriotic Swiss jurists occasionally dismiss objections to Swiss judicial
intervention as "biased," "not objective," and "dictated by particular
interests." 1 32 Recent case law, however, provides cause for some skepticism as to this defensive attitude. In the cases of Entrepose, Bucher-Guyer,
127

Id. This provision for ouster of court supervision departs from that of the

English Arbitration Act of 1979, permitting ouster "with some exceptions" when at
least one of the parties is foreign. Arbitration Act, 1979, c. 42, §§ 3(6)-(7) and 4(1).
128 B. VERF., CONST., COST. FED. art. 4.

Note that agreement to waive appeal for nullification of the award is not
equivalent to a complete abandonment of all court recourse. Claims of denial and
arbitrariness may still be raised when execution is sought. See Vischer & Volken,
129

supra note 40, at 364, commenting on Projet de Loi, supra note 40, art. 180, para. 2.
130 Id.
131 Cdt., supra note 2, art. 36(0.
132 See Budin, Arbitration in Switzerland in ARBITRATION AND THE LICENSING
PROCESS (R. Goldschrerber & M. de Haas, eds. 1981), at 5-113. See also Reymond,
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andBerardiv. Clair,courts interfered with awards containing neither shocking violations of fundamental legal principles nor flagrant disregard of facts.
Arbitrators had made honest decisions on difficult issues arising from complex fact patterns. By substituting their conclusions for those of the arbitrators, courts substantially reduced the autonomy of the arbitral process.
Renunciation of recourse to judicial evaluation of the legal and factual
merits of the controversy is implicit in most agreements to arbitrate. Unless
the parties agree to court scrutiny of the merits of their disputes, the
judiciary should limit its role to ensuring respect for the procedural fairness
of the arbitration, the rights of third parties and the integrity of the arbitrator's respect for his mission. Courts that disregard this choice risk emasculating the arbitral process and defeating its goals of adjudicatory privacy
and finality.
Calvin may have been correct that man is predestined to conformity to the
divine will. It need not follow, however, that the decisions of international
commercial arbitrators sitting in Geneva similarly must be subject to the will
of the temporal judge. Parties to international arbitration should not be free
to treat arbitration as mere foreplay to court proceedings.
Probl~mes .Actuels de

L'Arbitrage Commercial International, 40

REVUE

5 (1982), alleging that Swiss judges have shown restraint in
the exercise of their power to set aside "arbitrary" awards: "Jusqu'ici les tribunaux
cantonaux ont fait un usage hjust titre parcimonieux de leur pouvoir de d~clarer une
sentence arbitraire." Id. at 8.
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